A Global Power Game:

The Impact of the War of the Austrian Succession on Britain’s Naval Power and Colonial Influence

1740-1748

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"We bring therefore [indispensably] obliged to take up Arms, and entirely relying on the Help of Almighty God, who knows the uprightness of our intention, have thought fit to declare the War, and do hereby declare War against the French King; and We will in [pursuance] of such Declaration rigorously prosecute the same both by Sea and Land, being assured of the ready Concurrence and Assistance of all Our loving Subjects in to just a Cause."1

This quote is from Britain’s official declaration of war against France, issued by King George II in March 1744 as part of the War of the Austrian Succession. With this action, the war extended beyond the dynastic territorial conflict in Europe. Triggered by Maria Theresa’s controversial accession as Habsburg monarch in October 1740 and initiated by Frederick the Great’s invasion of Silesia in December 1740, the war evolved into a test of strength between Great Britain and a French-Spanish alliance.2 In this conflict, each party pursued their own interests, but the common denominator was to be found in the quest for power through naval domination and colonial advancement. These factors were the essential fuel for the global dimension of the war.3 It is evident that naval forces played a central role in this process, and their success or failure could change the position of a state in world politics. Great Britain, already the leading naval power, sought to extend this supremacy further, which made war inevitable.4 The War of the Austrian Succession presented an opportunity to achieve these goals. This article will explore the extent of British naval power’s success in the struggle for global power by analysing the course of the war in relation to the strategies of warfare both at sea and in the colonies.

Power at sea, once established, was far from guaranteed. It continually had to be defended, resulting in frequent shifts in the maritime hierarchy of power during the Early Modern Period. This was exemplified by the decline of the once-dominant power Spain in the 17th century, when the Netherlands and later France rose to supremacy.5 Following the conclusion of the War of the Spanish

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1 George II of Great Britain/Fleet, T: A copy of the declaration of war of the King of Great Britain, against the French King (Microform version available in the Readex Early American Imprints series), Boston 1744.
7 Royal Navy [internet resource].
8 Britain as Military Power, p. 92.
Succession (1701-1714), in which the French navy was severely weakened and the Spanish navy was nearly completely destroyed, Great Britain ascended to the top of the great naval powers. However, this ascendancy did not imply dominance in maritime trade. Spain still held sway in the Caribbean region in terms of trade, even though the Iberian country had long ceased to be a major competitor to Britain at sea. With the hope of strengthening its own influence in world trade, Britain consequently entered into the Asiento with Spain in 1713, a treaty that secured the privilege of transporting enslaved people to the Spanish colonies for 30 years. „In addition, [Great Britain] was allowed to send one ship a year to trade at the annual fair at Porto Bello.“ However, this trade agreement proved to be unprofitable for Great Britain and led to a deterioration of the Anglo-Spanish relationship due to illegal smuggling, which was more or less directly supported by the British government. These tensions culminated in the outbreak of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, first declared by King George II, which began in October 1739 and later merged into the War of the Austrian Succession. From the British perspective, the objective was to establish free trade with the West Indies and to displace Spain from its monopoly position. It was hoped “that British sea power would make the war swift, cheap, relatively bloodless and have a positive impact on British power and reputation that would transform Britain’s place in the world.” This optimism quickly faded with the onset of the War of the Austrian Succession and was ultimately extinguished with the entry of France into the global war effort in 1744. United through the shared lineage of the Bourbon line of rulers, Britain now faced the combined power of France and Spain - a formidable threat that rekindled the historical rivalry between the two great powers.

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6 The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 303.
10 Yellow Jack and the Worm, p. 1.
11 cf. ibid.
12 The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 19.
13 ibid. p. 9.
14 cb. ibid.
15 ibid.
16 Britain as Military Power, pp. 87-90.
Succession, primarily manifesting in colonial disputes. These conflicts were perpetuated in the War of the Austrian Succession. While Britain aimed to obstruct French maritime trade and the expansion of its colonies, it was in France’s interest to prevent the formation of a British maritime and imperial monopoly. As a result, two additional subordinate wars commenced alongside the ongoing War of Jenkins’ Ear’s War: The King George’s War in North America and the First Carnatic War in India. All three of these conflicts were primarily convoy wars, in which the aim was to disrupt the trade of the opponents as much as possible through the strategy of privateering and prize taking. Parallel to the prevention of Spanish and French trade, safeguarding its own trade through escorts was also one of the Royal Navy’s main missions. Nevertheless, patrolling the coast was not to be neglected, as it was necessary to protect against attacks on the British mainland or colonies. These three major missions required maritime military presence across the globe. Thus, it is evident that there was extraordinary pressure on the navy during the years of war, particularly as Britain increasingly defined itself based on its naval power. Moreover, there was a considerable public confidence in the Royal Navy. This is demonstrated by a contemporary quote from a politician named William Hay, who said, “It may be thought, and I have often heard it said, that our fleet will protect us: but our fleet is not always sure of meeting an enemy [...].” Furthermore, even during the war years of 1740 - 1748, such encounters with the enemy did not always end in a British victory, especially in the initial phase, with administrative challenges in organising the navy on a global scale being at fault. So, what exactly were the problems, and how did the administration attempt to address them?

During the brief period between the onset of the War of Jenkins’ Ear and the War of the Austrian Succession, the British navy primarily focused on Spain and even achieved a significant victory by capturing the important Spanish transatlantic port of Portobello under Admiral Edward Vernon. However, the outbreak of war in 1740 increased the demands on the Navy, especially with the prospect of war with France looming. In more peaceful times, it was common for states to reduce their navies to

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18 The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 2.


The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica: King George’s War, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica https://www.britannica.com/event/King-Georges-War.

20 The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 44.


22 The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 1, 10.

23 Quote in: Britain as Military Power, p. 93.

24 Ibid. p. 100.

25 The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 10 f.

Ibid. 10.


26 The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 9, 184.
a minimum, mainly due to financial or monetary considerations. Maintaining and manning the ships incurred substantial costs that governments were often reluctant to bear. Consequently, the British navy had severe administrative problems at the beginning of the war with France and was not at full strength. Initially, there was a supply problem in the colonies that led to a lack of provisions, weapons and ammunition, but even more critical, was the difficulty of recruiting seamen, who were in significant shortage. The Crown tried to combat this problem through two measures. The first was impressment by which sailors were forcibly conscripted into service, sometimes involving use of coercion or violence. A more favourable second measure was the promotion of privateering.

At the beginning of the war with France, the Crown issued letters of marque to approximately 1,152 private investors, granting them permission to capture enemy ships. This created an additional, effective, and inexpensive naval force whose main objective was not to protect its own trade but to disrupt that of the enemy. However, this mission was clearly not without risk. Since most private man-of-war ships were converted merchant ships, they often lacked the strength of even the smallest naval warships. Therefore, direct encounters were typically avoided. Moreover, privateering was not unique to Britain; it was also actively practised by France and Spain. In addition to the normal perils of sea voyages such as adverse weather and diseases like yellow fever, which could greatly decimate a ship’s crew, it was not unusual for a privateering ship to be captured by the enemy during its privateering voyage. Despite these risks, the prevalence of privateering suggests that it was deemed worthwhile. Privateers received their compensation through the sale of captured ships and their loaded cargo after the admiralty court had condemned them as lawful prizes. Depending on the value of the prizes, the privateers’ wage was not a fixed amount of money, but, in general, was considerably higher – sometimes six times greater - than the salaries paid in the navy. This gave rise to a vicious circle. On the one hand, privateers were needed to fight the enemy, but on the other hand, their

27 The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 41.
28 ibid, p. 40.
29 The War of the Austrian Succession, pp. 41 f. Yellow Jack and the Worm, pp. 5-9.
30 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 British Privateering Voyages of the Early Eighteenth Century, p. 10.
37 American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, p. 363.
38 The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 39.
39 Yellow Jack and the Worm, p. 9.
40 American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, p. 382.
involvement exacerbated the navy's staffing problem, which was noticeable in the quality of personell aboard its vessels.\(^\text{37}\) During the period of war with France, the number of men working on privateerings ships exceeded those serving on navy ships.\(^\text{38}\) This was problematic because the decisive battles still had to be fought by the navy, but during the War of the Austrian Succession only a few major naval battles took place – a fortunate coincidence for Britain?

The damage suffered by the Spanish and French navies during the War of the Spanish Succession had not yet been fully restored by the time of the War of the Austrian Succession, such that the two combined powers were consistently inferior to the British force, at least in terms of numbers. To illustrate using figures: “In 1746, France had 35 effective line of battle ships and 16 frigates. At the same time, Britain had 63 line of battle ships and 96 frigates [...]”\(^\text{39}\) Accordingly, the Bourbon alliance did not set out to challenge the British fleet directly, but rather utilized their ships to protect their merchant fleets.\(^\text{40}\) The only major naval battle was the Battle of Toulon on 22 February 1744, in which a British fleet of 30 ships of the line and 3 frigates, commanded by Thomas Mathews, encountered a Spanish-Franco fleet of 27 ships of the line and 3 frigates in the Mediterranean.\(^\text{41}\) Even though this armed conflict ended in a stalemate, the British actions during the battle were grossly flawed. These stemmed in part due to misunderstandings related to the navy's still rudimentary signalling system, but were mainly due to personal differences between the commanding admiral, Thomas Mathews, and his second-in-command, Richard Lestock.\(^\text{42}\) The result of this discord was a sensational court case that attracted great public interest, underscoring that the Navy's performance was not sufficient to meet the expectations of both politicians and citizens.\(^\text{43}\) Notably, on the day of the battle, Britain and France had not yet at war with each other, but the official declaration could be interpreted as a mere formality at that point. Britain’s primary concern at this juncture was the possibility of an invasion of the mainland by France.\(^\text{44}\) Indeed, it was their greatest hope that their own navy would prevent this this occurrence.\(^\text{45}\) This is precisely why the underwhelming performance at the Battle of Toulon was so fatal. Coupled with other losses, such as the failed expedition to Cartagena de Indias between March

\(^{37}\) ibid. \\
The War of the Austrian Succession, pp. 41 f. \\
\(^{38}\) American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, p. 382. \\
\(^{39}\) The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 304. \\
\(^{40}\) Ibid. pp. 304 f. \\
The War of the Austrian Succession, pp. 42-44. \\
\(^{41}\) Tucker, Spencer Coakley (Ed.): A Global Chronology of Conflict. From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East, vol. 1, Santa Barbara 2010, p. 743. \\
The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 43. \\
\(^{43}\) The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 339. \\
A Global Chronology, p. 743. \\
\(^{44}\) The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 3. \\
\(^{45}\) Britain as a Military Power, p. 93.
and May 1741 and defeats in smaller naval battles like the Battles of La Guerira and Puerto Cabello in the spring of 1743, it eroded public confidence in the navy by 1745.\textsuperscript{46} Although the period following this, leading up to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, was also riddled with further losses – including the capture of the important Indian trading post of Madras by the French in September 1746, which hit the British the hardest – the navy managed to demonstrate its prowess. In the autumn of 1746, the British launched an attack on the French port of Lorient, which they failed to capture but succeeded at destroying the nearby fortress of Quiberon.\textsuperscript{47} At sea, for example, the British won victories in the two battles of Cape Finisterre in May and October 1747, in which they were able to overwhelm large French merchant fleets.\textsuperscript{48} They inflicted such heavy damages on the escorting ships that the French subsequently struggled to provide adequate protection for their merchant ships, marking what was arguably the greatest triumph of these battles for Britain due to the disruption caused to the the colonial logistics of the French.\textsuperscript{49} However, Britain’s greatest success during the War of the Austrian Succession took place in North America, more precisely on Cape Breton Island off Nova Scotia. Acting on the initiative of Massachusetts Governor William Shirley, the British succeeded in conquering the French fortress of Louisbourg after a six-week siege. Militarily, Louisbourg was of great importance to France, as it was the only point of protection for their merchant ships in North America.\textsuperscript{50} With the conquest of the fortress, it was strategically planned to cut off France’s trade to the West Indies and thus drive the French out of North America.\textsuperscript{51} Louisbourg was perceived as the key to all of North America that would unlock the expansion of the British colonial empire and its global influence.\textsuperscript{52} In reality, the expedition was a major enterprise, one that would have been unmanageable for the navy alone due to the required strength of 3,000 men. However, in cooperation with the privateers, it led to success.\textsuperscript{53} It was

\textsuperscript{46} The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 303, 310.
\textsuperscript{48} ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{52} A Global Chronology of Conflict, p. 747
\textsuperscript{53} Shirley, William: Memoirs of the principal transactions of the last war between the English and French in North- America from the commencement of it in 1744, to conclusion of the Treaty at Aix la Chapelle, Boston 1758, p. 15.
the prospect of plundering the fortress after capture that motivated the privateers to participate.\textsuperscript{54} Meanwhile, on the other side of the globe, shortly before the end of the war, between August and October 1748, the British, under Admiral Edward Boscawen, launched another attempt to take French-occupied Pondicherry, following the capture of Madras by France. Unfortunately, the siege was halted due to adverse weather conditions and a significant outbreak of sickness and death within the British fleet.\textsuperscript{55} In the Eastern world, France managed to expand its colonial power temporarily, a feat that eluded Britain.\textsuperscript{56} At this point, based on the conquests in the colonial conflicts, it might seem apparent to designate France as the victor of the First Carnatic War and Britain as the victor of King George's War, but when considering the important backdrop of the predominance of trade warfare in these maritime conflicts, it is essential to not overlook the efficacy of privateering.

The impact of privateering expected by contemporaries is clearly visible in the fact that immediately following the declaration of war with France in March 1744, a British fleet under the command of Admiral Curtis Barnett was sent to the Indian Ocean to capture French merchant ships.\textsuperscript{57} Nevertheless, privateering operations were not limited to the eastern part of the world alone, they extended into the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and, above all, the English Channel and in North American waters, where enemy merchant ships were often attacked. Both privateers and the navy concentrated their efforts on the regions where the highest prizes could be expected.\textsuperscript{58} The Caribbean was particularly favoured by American privateers; Ships with valuable cargo such as coffee, cocoa, sugar and molasses started their journey to Europe from the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{59} On the opposing side, Spanish privateers were known to lurk in the Windward Passage and close to English ports within their own waters. The French, while more widely active, maintained a presence in the Mediterranean and the English Channel. The main base for French privateering was St. Malo, providing easy access to the English Channel and facilitating the targeting of British merchant ships.\textsuperscript{60} „The sheer number of captured ships reflects the importance of the raids during the war: 3238 on the French, 3434 on the British side.\”\textsuperscript{61} On the British side, these privateering efforts nearly completely eliminated the French trade with the East Indies and reduced trade with the West Indies by approximately 50 percent.\textsuperscript{62} This was accompanied by

\textsuperscript{54} ibid. 382.
\textsuperscript{55} A Global Chronology of Conflict, p. 753.
\textsuperscript{58} The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{59} American Privateering and Imperial Warfare p. 360, 366.
\textsuperscript{60} cf. The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{62} American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, p. 378.
significant supply bottlenecks in the French overseas territories, which were strongly felt in Martinique, for example.\(^{63}\) Spain also drastically reduced its merchant shipping operations, and the famous Spanish treasure ships had not sailed since the beginning of the war.\(^ {64}\) The goal of disrupting enemy trade had been achieved, highlighting the value of privateering as a valuable strategy. However, British trade also suffered considerable setbacks due to enemy privateering, leading to a sharp decline in merchant activity during the years of the war.\(^ {65}\) Complaints were received from traders in Parliament, expressing concerns that merchant shipping was not being given enough protection.\(^ {66}\) Nevertheless, it can be summarised that Great Britain had gained an advantage in the trade war, which likely would have continued to grow had the war continued. As mentioned earlier, by the end of 1747, France was no longer in a position to protect its merchant ships, potentially making the capture of ships easier. From this perspective, it can be considered fortunate for France that the War of the Austrian Succession ended with the Peace of Aachen in October 1748. Returning to the initial and most important question: How successful was British naval power in pursuit of a global power position?

The most obvious outcome of the eight years of warfare did not represent any major changes. The peace treaties largely restored the *status quo ante*, requiring Britain and France to return Louisbourg and Madras to each other.\(^ {67}\) At sea, Great Britain did suffer some defeats, but they were still able to maintain their position as the major power. Spain's trade sustained damage, but they managed to successfully defend their most crucial ports, allowing them to maintain trade dominance with the West Indies by the end of the war.\(^ {68}\) Nonetheless, Britain demonstrated that they were capable of waging a global war. Particularly until 1746, the global nature of the war with its various theatres in the War of Jenkins' Ear, King George's War and the First Carnatic War posed a challenge that needed to be overcome. The failure of the admiralty and politics to work together presented a major problem, resulting in the navy being stretched beyond its limits. It was only through overcoming these administrative difficulties and creating a functioning political and naval infrastructure that Britain was increasingly able to demonstrate its power - and this success would endure.\(^ {69}\) The experience gained in understanding the dynamics of global warfare became valuable knowledge and was applied shortly thereafter in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). This subsequent war led to a shift in the balance of power in Britain's favour.\(^ {70}\) The influence of the War of the Austrian Succession on the strength of

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\(^{63}\) The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 341.

\(^{64}\) American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, p. 378

\(^{65}\) cf. ibid. pp. 378-381.

\(^{66}\) cf. American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, p. 39.


\(^{68}\) The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, p. 338.

\(^{69}\) The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy, pp. 344-348.

\(^{70}\) Die belagerte Stadt, p. 424 f.
British naval power and the colonial struggle played a pivotal role in shaping future warfare and may have contributed to Britain’s later successes.

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